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Abstract. The ability of defining privacy preferences in the current social platforms
are very restricted. Typically, the user is provided with only some predefined options
to select from. In this paper, we present an approach that exploits Semantic Web
policies allowing users to control privacy in social web applications. Such policies are
general statements that define the behavior of a system. Although Semantic Web
policies gained a lot of interest in recent years and policy languages became more and
more complex, suitable and easy-to-use solutions for highly dynamic social platforms
are still needed. In order to allow common users to define policies about the data to be
shared, we introduce natural language policies. We further present an implementation
based on the policy framework Protune that allows users of a collaborative learning
platform to restrict access to their learning material to collaborators by means of
controlled natural language policies.
1 Introduction
Since the web became a place where people are not only consuming content but creating,
publishing and sharing content, it is needed to allow people to exactly define who is allowed
to access which part of the content they provide. Unfortunately, there is currently no simple
way to restrict access to some content to only a set of trusted parties not previously known
or to decide who is allowed to access some part of a profile [1]. In Flickr for instance, you
are allowed to define people as friends or family members and, based on those assignments,
it can be decided who is allowed to see what picture. Still more fine-grained access control
management is lacking. Thus, if both, colleagues and close friends, are in the same group,
there is no way to restrict access to a subgroup for a particular picture [1]. Other web
applications for sharing data or social platforms do also allow only for similar limited access
control features leading to a high potential of leaking private data [2].
Semantic Web policies have gained a lot of interest in the last years and promising
approaches show their applicability to real-life applications, be they in the area of web
personalization, agent and network control, or access control on the web. For this reason
a number of policy languages have been defined in the last years. Nevertheless a major
hindrance to widespread adoption of policy languages are their shortcomings in terms of
usability: in order to be machine-understandable all of them rely on a formal syntax, which
common users find unintuitive and hard to grasp. Therefore, in most such applications,
policies are required to be authored by system administrators or specifically trained people.
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In this paper, we present an approach that overcomes both mentioned shortcomings: the
limited access control capabilities of existing collaborative systems and the complexity of
current policy languages. First, we do not restrict the user to role-based access control on
the basis of user groups or similar but we allow users to specify general policies providing
fine-grained access control. Second, our approach does not require users to define policies in
formal languages but provides an interface for natural language policies.
In the presented approach, we apply Protune and its corresponding policy language. By
doing so we additionally benefit from the features of an advanced policy engine such as
the generation of natural language text explaining the result of a policy evaluation (e.g.,
why access was denied) or the support of trust negotiation [3]. Further, we use an adapted
version of the controlled natural language ACE to define policies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we identify
requirements a general privacy control solution should fulfill. In Section 3 we provide some
background information on Semantic Web policies and controlled natural languages. Then,
in Section 4 and 5 we detail how policies can be used to control privacy in social web
applications. Section 6 introduces our prototype and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Motivation and Problem Statement
Preserving privacy in social platforms is a known challenge (see [4] for an information leakage
on Facebook or [5] for a similar case on Flickr). Existing social platforms provide only limited
means to define access control rights [6]. The problem is that privacy preferences have to be
easy to define but still expressive enough to capture all possible cases and combinations of a
user’s wishes to define who is allowed to access what. An additional challenge is the dynamics
of nowadays social networks. We identified the following requirements for a solution aiming
at preserving privacy on a social platform.
Adaptive to social network dynamics. Since nowadays social networks change
rapidly, any solution should be able to easily adapt itself to changes in the data of re-
questers.
Fine-grained. Privacy preferences can be arbitrary fine-grained. If a picture shall be
shared only with a restricted set of people (maybe not even known in advance), it should
be easy to express such requirement.
Extensible. Privacy preferences should be easily extensible: imagine a user uploads a
new set of pictures to a social platform and she wants them to be shared with attendees
of a conference. The user’s current privacy preferences should be easily extensible without
requiring all conference attendees to be registered at the social platform.
Natural language interface and feedback. Defining privacy preferences has to re-
main a simple and straightforward process. Access control decisions should be transparent
and well explained to users. Similarly, the specification of privacy preferences has to protect
users from collections of check boxes defining which friends is allowed to access which file or
from similar complicated policy definitions.
Security mechanisms. Last, but not least, any solution must fulfill basic security and
privacy requirements, such as reliability, support to authentication, delegation of rights and
evidences (such as credentials and declarations), etc.
3 Background
3.1 Semantic Web Policies
Semantic Web policies are statements defining the behavior of a system. Access control
policies define the conditions to be fulfilled in order to get access to a certain resource.
Policies are pervasive in all web-related contexts [7] and are needed to protect any system
open to the internet. They declaratively specify requirements which must be fulfilled but do
not state how they have to be fulfilled, thereby providing a separation between specification
and enforcement. Privacy policy frameworks such as the Platform for Privacy Preferences
(P3P) or EPAL are exploited to assist users while they are browsing the web and interacting
with web services. The early policy frameworks were rather decision support systems than
systems for declarative behavior control [7]. Moreover, they were not expressive enough to
fully address Semantic Web scenarios involving reasoning, ontology-based knowledge rep-
resentation, etc. Nowadays, a number of policy languages have been developed in order to
address the challenges of the Semantic Web: expressiveness, simplicity, enforceability, scala-
bility, and analyzability [8]. Among the most prominent ones (see [14] for a broad overview
of policy languages and their features) we mention KAoS [9], Rei [10], PeerTrust [11], and
Protune [12]. In order to provide a well-defined semantics these policy languages are typ-
ically based on languages logical formalisms like description logics (e.g., KAoS and Rei)
or logic programming (e.g., Cassandra [13], PeerTrust, and Protune). Policy engines are in
charge of evaluating policies (i.e., of checking whether they are satisfied or not).
The Policy Framework Protune
In our approach we used the Protune3 (PRovisional TrUst NEgotiation) framework for
policy evaluation and enforcement. Protune [12] aims at combining distributed trust man-
agement policies with provisional-style business rules and access control-related actions.
Protune features an advanced policy language for policy-driven negotiation and supports
distributed credentials management and flexible policy protection mechanisms. The Pro-
tune policy framework offers a high flexibility for specifying any kind of policy, referring
to external systems from within a policy and providing facilities for increasing user aware-
ness, like automatic generation of natural language explanations of the result of a policy’s
evaluation.
The Protune policy language is Logic Programming-based and as such a Protune policy
has much in common with a Logic Program. An example Protune policy is
allow(access(Requester,Resource))← friend(Requester), family picture(Resource).
states that a requester can access a resource if the requester is a friend and the resource is a
family picture. (According to the standard Logic Programming conventions, terms start-
ing with a capital letter refer to variables; that is, Resource indicated that the policy
applies to every resource.) Adding the following facts family picture(′holiday.jpg′). and
friend(′Bob′). will allow Bob to access the picture holiday.jpg. In general, a Protune
policy rule has one of the following formats:
allow(action)← condition1, . . . , conditionn.
3 http://policy.L3S.uni-hannover.de/
condition← condition1, . . . , conditionn.
(where n ≥ 0), meaning that the action action is allowed (resp. the condition condition
holds) if all conditions conditioni hold.
A policy may require that, in order to evaluate a request, some actions are performed,
that is, some of the conditioni can be actions themselves. For example, rule
allow(action1)← action2.
can be read as: action1 can be executed if action2 has been executed. In a typical scenario
access to some resource is allowed only if the requester provides a valid credential (in this
case, action2 would be sending a credential). Notice the different semantics of the actions
according to the side of the rule they appear in: the execution of actions appearing in the
left-hand can be requested by some party, whereas the actions appearing in the right-hand
side have to be performed in order to accomplish the request. In order to stress this semantic
difference, actions in the left-side of a rule must appear inside the allow predicate.
The evaluation of a policy may require to deal with objects which can be modeled as
sets of (attribute, value) pairs. The Protune language allows to refer to such properties of
an object by means of so-called complex terms.
identifier.attribute : value
For example, a rule stating that only credit cards whose company is VISA are accepted
could look like the following.
accepted(CreditCard)← CreditCard.company :′ V ISA′.
3.2 Controlled Natural Languages
Controlled natural languages (CNLs) are formal languages which have been designed in order
not to look like formal languages but to be more user-friendly. As formal languages they
are described by a formal grammar each well-formed sentence must comply to. Moreover,
they embed disambiguation rules in order to deterministically disambiguate sentences which
in full natural language have different readings, as it happens with the following standard
example: Bob looks at the girl on the hill with a telescope. In full natural language such
sentence can have at least three different meanings according to the context it appears in,
namely
– Bob looks with a telescope at the girl who is on the hill.
– Bob looks at the girl who is on the hill and has a telescope.
– Bob is on the hill, has a telescope and looks at the girl.
Although the last reading may be considered a bit unlikely, it cannot be excluded. In order
to disambiguate such sentences, CNLs usually come along with a set of built-in rules which
allow to deterministically select one out of n possible readings. For instance the CNL ACE
assumes that all prepositional phrases refer to the predicate, therefore in the example above
the action “looking” happens “towards the girl”, “on the hill” and “with a telescope”, boiling
down to the third one of the readings listed above.
Ambiguity resolution takes place on a purely syntactic basis, so that CNLs typically
do not differentiate between “God’s sake” and “John’s love”, being both of them built
according to the pattern [proper name]’s [common noun], although in everyday’s speech
one probably means that it is God to be loved whereas it is John to love.
The ACE controlled natural language
In our approach we use Attempto Controlled English (ACE [15]). ACE is a controlled
natural language developed at the University of Zurich with the aim to serve as specification
and knowledge representation language on the Semantic Web. ACE is intended for profes-
sionals who “need to use formal notations and formal methods, but may not be familiar
with them”4. The Attempto Parsing Engine (APE) deterministically translates ACE texts
into a semantically equivalent internal format (Discourse Representation Structure—DRS)
which is easier to further process in an automatic way. ACE and APE come along with a
set of tools able to translate DRSs into various other languages (e.g., FOL, PQL, FLUX,
RuleML) and a rule format to be used for Courteous Logic Programs [16] and stable model
semantics [17]. A prototypical bidirectional translation of ACE into and from OWL DL has
been developed as well.
4 Controlled natural language for easy specification of privacy
policies
A major hindrance to widespread adoption of policy languages are their shortcomings in
terms of usability: in order to be machine-understandable all of them rely on a formal
syntax, which common users find unintuitive and hard to grasp. The use of controlled natural
languages can improve usability of policy languages. This section describes how we exploit (a
subset of) ACE in order to express policies and describe the mapping between ACE policies
and the policies written in the Protune language. The full details of the ACE→Protune
translation are available in [18]. The following ACE policies are corresponding to the Protune
policies introduced in Section 3.1.
– If the requester is a friend and the resource is a family-picture then the requester can
access the resource.
– If the company of a credit-card is “VISA” then the credit-card is accepted.
These examples show which features of (ACE and therefore of) the English language can be
used in order to define Protune policies: common nouns (like requester), adjectives (like
accepted), verbs (like access), genitives (like in company of a credit-card) and strings
(like "VISA"). The following example also shows that proper names (e.g., Bob), adjectives
in comparative (e.g., older than) as well as in superlative form, integers (e.g., 18) as well
as reals, prepositional phrases (e.g., in "adult-content-folder"), saxon genitives (e.g.,
Bob’s) and relative pronouns (e.g., everything which is) are supported too.
If the requester is older than 18 and she is Bob’s friend then she can access everything
which is in “adult-content-folder”.
As described in Section 3.1, Protune policies conform to given patterns. It is therefore
intuitive that ACE policies (meant to be translated into Protune policies) also must conform
4 http://attempto.ifi.uzh.ch/site/
to predefined patterns. It is indeed the case since, roughly speaking (more on this in [18]),
ACE policies must have one of the following formats.
– If condition1 and . . . and conditionn then action.
– If condition1 and . . . and conditionn then condition.
where n ≥ 0, condition and conditioni (0 ≤ i ≤ n) are phrases containing the features
listed above (e.g., the requester is a friend or the resource is a family-picture)
and action is a phrase containing (beside the features listed above) the modal verb can (e.g.,
the requester can access the resource). As the reader can see, all policies presented
in this section as well as those listed in Table 1 and 2 conform to these patterns.
After having introduced the ACE→Protune mapping in an intuitive way, we conclude
this section by providing a more principled approach to the translation by listing the most
remarkable mapping rules we defined.
A programmer asked to formalize the sentence John sends Mary the credential as a
logic program would most likely come up with a rule like send(john, mary, credential). In-
deed in many cases translating verbs into predicate( name)s can be considered the most
linear approach, which we pursued as well. However this approach only allows to pro-
duce predicates with a number of parameters up to three. In order to support predicates
with a bigger number of parameters we decided to exploit ACE propositional phrases.
For instance, sentence If . . . then John pays the book with the credit-card. is translated
to ′pay#with′(′John′, Book, Credit card)← . . .
The statement John is Mary’s friend can be seen as asserting some information about
entity “Mary”, namely that the value of her property “friend” is “John”. It should be then
intuitive exploiting Protune complex terms (recall Section 3.1) to map such ACE sentence
to ′Mary′.friend :′ John′.
When translating noun phrases like a user it must be decided if it really matters whether
we are speaking about a “user” (in which case the noun phrase could be translated as
user(X)) or not (in which case the noun phrase could be translated as a variable X).
According to our experience, policy authors tend to use specific concepts even if they actually
mean generic entities. For this reason we followed the second approach, according to which
the sentence If a user owns a file then the user can access the file. is translated into the
Protune rule: allow(access(User, F ile))← own(User, F ile). If it is needed to point out that
the one owning a file is a user, the sentence can be rewritten e.g., as follows: If X is a user and
X owns a file then X can access the file. which gives the translation: allow(access(X,File))
← user(X), own(X,File).
In the following section we will detail how such natural language policies can be used for
privacy preservation in a social platform.
5 Policy Enforcement for Preserving Privacy in Social Platforms
Using policies and the policy framework Protune for access control provides the user with
a fine-grained specification of his privacy preferences in a declarative manner. So far we
explained how natural language eases the specification of access control policies. In this
section we explain how enforcing those policies preserves privacy in social data sharing
platforms.
ACE Policy Protune Policy
P1 If a document is protected then allow(access(Requester0, Document0))←
if the requester sends a student-id protected(Document0),
and the student-id’s issuer is “uni-hannover” send(Requester0, Student id0),
then the requester can access the document. Student id0.issuer :′ uni hannover′.
P2 Every requester can access everything allow(access(Requester0, Something0))←
which is an employee-credential. ′employee credential′(Something0).
Table 1. A lecturer’s policy, in CNL and its corresponding Protune translation.
ACE Policy Protune Policy
P3 If a document is protected then allow(access(Requester0, Something0))←
if the requester sends an employee-credential C send(Requester0, Employee credential0),
and the issuer of C is ”uni-hannover” Employee credential0.issuer :′ uni hannover′,
then the requester can access everything ′student id′(Something0).
which is a student-id.
Table 2. A student’s policy, in CNL and its corresponding Protune translation.
Since policies are declarative statements and by using a current state-of-the-art policy
engine, we allow advanced control of data sharing. We will now shortly name those fea-
tures [19]—instantiated as the features of Protune—and describe their benefits for social
software:
Negotiations: In traditional access control or authorization scenarios only one party
is able to specify policies which the other one has to conform to. Typically only one of the
interacting parties is enabled to specify the requirements the other has to fulfill, whereas the
other has no other choice but satisfying them (and thereby being authorized) or not (and
thereby not being authorized). Therefore, a more expressive approach allows both parties to
discuss (i.e., negotiate) in order to reach an agreement. Trust Negotiations [3], for example,
allow both parties to incrementally disclose information in order to get or grant access to
some data on a social platform. As an example, see the policies in the Tables 1 and 2:
if the student requests access to a lecturers document that is protected, she is asked to
provide her student id. But the student herself protects her student id by Policy P3 stating
that any party that requests the student id has to be an employee of the University of
Hannover. Consequently, the lecturers request for a student id leads to the student’s request
for the lecturer’s employee credential. Since this credential is not protected (see Policy P2),
it is disclosed, therefore the student discloses the student id and is allowed to access the
protected document. Mind that, first, this procedure is automatically performed by the
parties’ Protune clients and that, second, without such a negotiation, the student would not
have got access to the document.
Evaluation and Actions: In order to evaluate a policy, some actions performed by the
policy infrastructure might be required. Examples for such actions are sending credentials
or queries to external systems, for example in order to decide if the requester is a registered
friend on some other social platform. In this case, the Protune policy enforcement infras-
tructure can automatically query this platform to get the required information. Another
common action is the retrieval of environmental properties like the current system time
(e.g., if access is allowed only in a specific time frame) or location (e.g., share files only
with people in the same meeting room). By doing this, privacy control in social platforms
becomes extensible and information from other accessible social platforms can be exploited
for security decisions.
Explanations: As stated in Section 3.1, with Protune it is possible to generate expla-
nations [20] out of the policies and the decisions they make. On the one hand, this helps
a user to check whether the policies she created are correct and, on the other hand, they
inform other users about why a decision was taken (or how the users can change the de-
cision by performing a specific action). For example, whenever access to a certain data or
resource is denied on a data sharing platform, an explanation why the request failed can
be provided. Given the example from Tables 1 and 2, a requester that does not disclose her
student id would get an explanation such as “I cannot find a Credential such that Creden-
tial is a student id.” Together with the authoring of policies in CNL, such natural language
explanations encapsulate the formal policy evaluation completely from the user.
Strong/lightweight evidences: The result of a policy’s evaluation may depend on the
identity or other properties of a requester such as age, membership in a certain club, etc.
Protune provide a means to communicate such properties. Usually, this is done by sending
digital certificates called strong evidences. Typical strong evidences are credentials signed
by trusted entities called certification authorities. Lightweight evidences [21] are non signed
declarations or statements (e.g., license agreements).
Ontologies: In trust negotiations as they are described above, policies have to be ex-
changed among entities within the social platform in order to transfer information about
what is needed to fulfill a policy. For example, the lecturer’s Protune client in the example
has to transfer the policy protecting the document in order to let the student’s client know
that a student id is required. Although the basic constructs may be defined in the policy
language (e.g., rule structure and semantics), policies may be used in different applications
and even define new concepts. The ontology support of Protune helps to provide well-defined
semantics for new concepts to be understood by different entities[22, 23].
All those features of our approach meet the requirements identified in Section 2 as
follows. Using the Protune language makes our privacy solution adaptive and fine-grained.
Protune’s ability to add external data sources allows to extend our solution towards data
sources that lay outside of the actual social platform. The natural language policy definition
and Protune’s explanation facility makes our approach talk natural language to the user and
vice versa. Last but not least, our solution comprises the common security features. The logic
programming nature of the policy language behind makes the privacy enforcement reliable.
6 Implementation
In this section we present a prototype implementing privacy control in a collaborative plat-
form with natural language policies.5 We realized the presented approach as an extension to
the collaborative learning environment LearnWeb2.0 [24]. LearnWeb2.0 is a Web2.0 appli-
cation which integrates several Web2.0 tools and allows the user to collaboratively develop
new competences while staying in a single comfortable environment. Therefore, LearnWeb2.0
supports sharing and rating of arbitrary resources that help developing competences.
The extension we describe in this paper allows users to exactly define which condition a
user has to meet in order to access a resource that is shared on the platform. These policies
can be defined in controlled natural language policies and are subsequently translated into
Protune policies and enforced whenever a user requests access to a resource belonging to a
5 The prototype is accessible at http://learnweb.L3S.uni-hannover.de.
Fig. 1. Creating a policy with the ACE policy editor.
collaborator. Before we detail our extension, we first shortly introduce the features of the
LearnWeb2.0 platform.
6.1 LearnWeb2.0
The main goal of LearnWeb2.0 is to help the user to organize, rate, and manage resources
that support the development of her desired competences. In order to create one’s own
specific set of learning resources, there are three ways to add resources to the repository.
First, the user search via the LearnWeb2.0 search utility for publicly available content in a
collection of Web2.0 tools such as YouTube, Flickr, Ipernity, GroupMe!, and Delicious. The
user can then select resources that correspond to the desired competence and add them to her
LearnWeb2.0 repository. Second, LearnWeb2.0 offers the user a virtual desktop facility with
access to all resources (including private ones) stored on different Web2.0 applications in her
own accounts. Third, resources can be directly uploaded from the user’s desktop. Therefore
LearnWeb2.0 offers a common upload interface which stores the uploaded resources on
suitable Web2.0 accounts that are connected to LearnWeb2.0. Given this upload feature, a
user can store pictures on Flickr, videos on YouTube, audio tracks on Ipernity and the like
from one single platform, namely LearnWeb2.0. Furthermore, resources can be commented,
tagged and rated by other LearnWeb2.0 users who are authorized to access them according
to the resource owner’s policy. Thus a group of users can be established that share learning
material and therefore are supported by collaboratively developing a particular competence.
6.2 The ACE Policy Editor
Fig. 1 is a screenshot of the ACE Policy Editor a user can use in order to define Protune
policies by means of ACE sentences. This editor is based on the predictive authoring tool6
developed by the ACE group. The ACE Policy Editor guides the user step by step during the
creation or modification of policies and makes sure that only sentences are created which
can be translated into Protune policies. Therefore the translation of such sentences into
Protune policies will never lead to errors.
The text field marked with (1) is read-only and shows the beginning of an ACE policy.
This field is automatically updated whenever the user deletes the last inserted token (by
pressing the button “Delete”) or add a new token which has been accepted by the editor (cf.
below). The text field (2) can be used for entering the next words of the sentence. Whenever
the “OK” button is pressed, such words are moved to the text field (1) up to the point
where a word is not a correct continuation of the already entered sentence. From this point
on, the remaining of the text is kept in (2). Clicking on the entries of the lists (3) is an
alternative way to construct a sentence. Each and all words which can be entered at the
current position of the sentence are shown according to their grammatical category. In the
depicted case, only proper names, intransitive predicates, and so on are allowed. The list
for common nouns, for example, is not shown because common nouns are not allowed to
appear behind the common noun requester in the depicted sentence.
6.3 Extending LearnWeb2.0 with Natural Language Privacy Policies
We extended LearnWeb2.0 by a policy management dialog (see Figure 2). For each policy the
title and the text in natural language is returned and displayed in the table. The user has a
possibility to edit each of them, or add a new one by supplying a policy title to the creation
form and clicking on the submit button. For creating and editing policies LearnWeb2.0
calls the ACE policy editor described in the previous section. The created policies are first
translated to Protune policies and then submitted to a Protune server responsible for the
policy evaluation.
Policy enforcement is integrated by quering the Protune server whenever a user requests
access to another user’s resource. For example, in the search function of LearnWeb2.0, only
those resources are accessible for the user where the policy evaluation succeeded. Currently,
the result of a policy evaluation from Protune server we are using is restricted to boolean
decisions. That is, either a policy request fails or does not. Therefore, currently, trust nego-
tiations are not possible since they require more advanced evaluation results describing the
required steps that make the negotiation succeed.
7 Conclusions and Further Work
In this paper we describe a flexible solution for access control in social platforms based on
controlled natural language policies. This approach allows users to exactly define with whom
they want to share their data whereas current solutions require the user to fill out predefined
forms with only a subset of the possible privacy conditions. Moreover, we allow the user to
6 http://attempto.ifi.uzh.ch/aceeditor/
Fig. 2. The LearnWeb privacy settings featuring natural language policies.
define such policies in controlled natural language. We implemented this approach as an
extension to the collaborative environment LearnWeb2.0 based on the policy framework
Protune and the controlled natural language ACE.
As future work, we plan to extend our implementation to serve for all feature provided by
Protune such as explanations and negotiations. The translation of natural language policies
to Protune policies still requires careful extensions toward meta-policies. Finally, extensive
user studies are on our agenda.
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